

# Sense data and *ākāra*

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## 1 Introduction: A general survey

In this article I am going to compare two epistemological doctrines of two different traditions and periods, doctrines that concern immediate objects of perception and their relation to our common beliefs about material objects. The one is the doctrine of sense data that was propagated by twentieth century analytic philosophers such as Moore, Russell, Price and Ayer. The other is the doctrine of *ākāra* held by the Buddhist epistemologists and logicians Dignāga and Dharmakīrti of the fifth and seventh centuries, respectively. It is well known that the sense data doctrine has several variations, especially with respect to the ontological status of sense data: Some have argued that sense data are mind-dependent entities, while others consider them to be aspects or parts of material objects. The same controversy occurred in classical Indian epistemology with respect to *ākāra*: Some thinkers assumed *ākāra* to be mental, while others held it to belong to the external object. Here, however, I shall deal only with those theories that consider sense data and *ākāra* to be mind-dependent.<sup>1</sup>

Within these limits, one can further notice that the existence of *ākāra* and the existence of sense data are justified through similar arguments.<sup>2</sup> That sense data are different from physical objects is defended by arguments from illusion and hallucination. When one views a straight stick that is half

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<sup>1</sup>As a consequence, in the following I shall translate the term “*ākāra*” as “mental form.” Although Dharmakīrti uses the term in two senses, that of *grāhakākāra* (the mental form of grasping, viz. its subjective form) and *grāhyākāra* (the mental form to be grasped, viz. its objective form) in the mind, the present article is mainly concerned with the latter concept. For a detailed study on the notion of *ākāra*, cf. [6, pp. 92–95]. On the basis of early Yogācāra literature, in his study he has translated the term as “phenomenological content” or “mode of appearance.” Whether these translations can be used for *ākāra* in Dharmakīrti’s texts is, however, still unclear.

<sup>2</sup>This summary is mainly based on Ayer [2, p. 94–104]. The argument from illusion used by sense-data philosophers has been sharply criticized by Austin [1]. For a more detailed survey on sense data, cf. [9].

submerged in water, the stick appears bent. In actual fact, however, the stick is not bent, and thus what we see is an illusion. In this case, one perceives something non-physical (a bent stick). Likewise, we experience hallucinations in which we perceive mental images that have no external objects causing them. The non-physical character of the immediate object of awareness occurring in these cases is then generalised for all cases of sense-perception: the true object of perception is a mental entity that appears directly; this is called a sense datum. Sense-data philosophers have aimed to base all empirical knowledge on such sense-data.

Similarly, in Dharmakīrti's system, *ākāra*, i.e., a mental form, is the immediate object of perception, especially when Dharmakīrti adopts the Sautrāntika position that presupposes the external world. In this position, we do not perceive external objects directly, but rather perceive them through the medium of their mental forms appearing in cognitions. In *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) III 402-406,<sup>3</sup> Dharmakīrti notes that when a person whose vision has been damaged by the *timira*-disease sees light (*prāṇīpa*), he sees colourful circles (*maṇḍala*) resembling the eye in a peacock's tail. He does not perceive the external object (i.e., the light), but merely a mental form (i.e., circles). This observation is then generalized for all cases: all cognitions contain a mental form to be grasped (*grāhyākāra*) as its own nature.<sup>4</sup>

In spite of the similar reasoning to defend their existence, however, sense data and *ākāra* have different contextual backgrounds: Sense-datum philosophers have introduced the concept of indubitable sense data that justifies empirical knowledge to counter sceptical arguments that question the existence of material objects. In contrast, Dharmakīrti's theory of *ākāra* is not a reaction to sceptical arguments at all. Accordingly, although his discussions, based on the Sautrāntika ontology, relate to our common beliefs of external objects, one finds no attempt to securely ground these beliefs on

<sup>3</sup>According to Tosaki's analysis, this argument is the fifth argument for proving cognition's nature of having two forms, viz. *grāhakākāra* and *grāhyākāra*. In the above argument, Dharmakīrti aims to establish the existence of *grāhyākāra*, but pays no attention to *grāhakākāra*. Cf. [24, pp. 82-85].

<sup>4</sup>Because of these comparable characters, some modern scholars of Buddhism have referred to the doctrine of sense data or used it in their descriptions of the Buddhist theory of perception. Cf. [10, pp. 215-228], [11], [23, pp. 37-66], [4, Chapter 19], and [12]. Of these, [10, pp. 217sq] has examined whether the term *pratibhāsa* (appearance) can be considered equivalent to sense data, but rejects this idea, stating that an appearance in a conceptualized illusion "involves a judgment, an interpretation of the datum." However, his examination disregards non-conceptualized illusion as exemplified by the illusion of the net of hair seen by a sufferer of the *timira* eye disease. By its definition, this illusion is free of conceptual constructions (*kalpanā*), including judgments. Thus, as far as the nature of being free of conceptualization or interpretation is concerned, *ākāra* or the (non-conceptualized) appearance of an object in a cognition cannot be differentiated from a sense-datum.

the concept of *ākāra*. This does not necessarily mean, however, that Dharmakīrti was not confronted with similar problems concerning the relationship between internal and external objects. Specifically, while examining the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and its result (*phala*), he deals with the problem of how an *ākāra* in self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) relates to our common belief in external objects. The aim of this article is to examine how Dharmakīrti and his successors attempted to refute Kumārila's attack on Dignāga, viz. that in Dignāga's theory, means and result would incur the fallacy of having different objects (*bhinnārthatva/viśayabheda*). This will help to clarify contextual distinctions between the theory of *ākāra* and the sense data theory.

## 2 The problem of *bhinnārthatva/viśayabheda*

In his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (*PS*) I 8cd-10, Dignāga presents a detailed examination of the relationship between the means of a valid cognition and its result<sup>5</sup> that entails three significant points which lead to Kumārila's later criticism: (1) the means of valid cognition and its result are identical, (2) not only the object-cognition, but also self-awareness is assumed to be the result, (3) a cognition's having a mental form corresponding to an external object is the means of valid cognition with respect to an external object. Based on these points, Kumārila raises the following problem in his *Ślokavārttika*:

On the other hand, [the Buddhist claim] that self-awareness is the result is not correct, because this [self-awareness] will be refuted [later<sup>6</sup>]. It is also not correct because if the means of valid cognition is the object-form (*viśayākāra*) [of the cognition], then [the means of valid cognition and self-awareness] have different objects (*bhinnārthatva*).<sup>7</sup>

According to the commentator Sucarita Miśra, this verse aims to refute the Sautrāntika position that is expressed in *PS* I 9.<sup>8</sup> Although Dignāga's

<sup>5</sup>Cf. [7, pp. 28sq & 97–107].

<sup>6</sup>In *ŚV śūnyavāda*, Kumārila refutes Dignāga's theory of self-awareness.

<sup>7</sup>Cf. *ŚV* pratyakṣa 79: *svasaṃvittiphalatvaṃ tu tanniṣedhān na yujyate / pramāṇe viśayākāre bhinnārthatvān na yujyate //*

The above translation is based on Taber [21, p. 81]. For the background of the verse, cf. [21, pp. 80–81 & 194–196, fn. 86]. Cf. also *TSP* 1350cd.

<sup>8</sup>Cf. *Kāś* 237.18–25. Here, Sucarita Miśra quotes *PS* I 9 with a different word order and some variants: *viśayākāra evāśya pramāṇaṃ tena mīyate / svasaṃvittih phalaṃ cātra tadrūpo hy arthaniścayaḥ //*

In this case, *pramāṇa* and *phala* are clearly identical with *viśayākāra* and *svasaṃvitti*, respectively. *PS* I 9 originally reads as follows: *svasaṃvittih phalaṃ vātra tadrūpo hy arthaniścayaḥ // viśayākārataivāśya pramāṇaṃ tena mīyate //*

verse and its auto-commentary can be interpreted in another manner, according to Kumārila and his followers, the verse proposes the following schema:

model	<i>prameya</i>	<i>pramāṇa</i>	<i>phala</i>
Dignāga's model	( <i>bahirartha</i> )	<i>viśayākāra</i> /(- <i>tā</i> )	<i>svasaṃvitti</i>

Since self-awareness is the cognition of a cognition itself, it does not relate to an external object. A means of valid cognition, on the other hand, does relate to an external object. Means and result are therefore concerned, respectively, with two different objects, despite Dignāga's assertion that they are identical. This is the problem of *bhinnārthatva*, as Kumārila points out. When examined closely, the problem actually arises from the dual function of mental forms, which, on one hand, causally depend on external objects, but on the other hand, appear within the mind, according to the *svasaṃvedana* doctrine, being intrinsically aware of itself. If one emphasizes that a mental form depends causally on an external object, an additional explanation is required for the necessity of self-awareness that does not relate to external objects; if one maintains the theory of self-awareness, the means of accessing external objects is closed. Buddhist epistemologists are now in a dilemma between these two alternatives.

### 3 The causal connection of self-awareness with object-cognition

To solve this problem, Dharmakīrti presents a logical way to connect self-awareness with object-cognition (*arthaviśiṣṭa*). Commenting on *PS* I 9cd, he first clarifies the point of Dignāga's argument: even if one accepts an external object to be the object of valid cognition (*prameya*), the experience of the cognition itself (*svānubhava*), viz. self-awareness, is the result of the means of valid cognition. Unlike in Yogācāra idealism, according to which the subjective form in cognition (*grāhakākāra*) is accepted as the means of valid cognition, in this case, something that relates to an external object must be the means of valid cognition, viz. the cognition having the appearance of the object (*arthābhāsātā*).<sup>9</sup> Now a question arises about the

<sup>9</sup>Alternatively, self-awareness is here the result; for the determination of an [external] object has the nature of this [self-awareness]. The means of valid cognition for this [object] is exactly [cognition's] having the form of an [external] object. [The object] is cognized by means of this [cognition's having the form of an external object]. According to the *Vṛtti*, only the last half of the verse presupposes external objects, and it is unclear which result the means of valid cognition will cause. Thus, it is difficult to say that the entire verse is based on the Sautrāntika ontology. Cf. [7, pp. 28sq & 100–106].

<sup>9</sup>Cf. *PV* III 346: *tadārthābhāsātāivāsya pramāṇaṇaṁ na tu sann api / grāhakātmā 'parārthatatvād bahyeṣv artheṣv apekṣyate //*

relationship between three items, viz. (1) cognition having the mental form of the object, (2) self-awareness, and (3) object-cognition. This point is addressed in *PV* III 347-350, which Dharmakīrti describes as the consideration of [a cognition's] own nature (*svabhāvacintā*)<sup>10</sup> :

[The means of valid cognition is *arthābhāsātā*] because, just like this nature of the object (*arthātman*, i.e., the mental form of the object<sup>11</sup>) that has entered (*niviṣṭa*) into a cognition, so is [the object] ascertained from self-awareness (*ātmasaṃvid*) [in the form] that this [object that] has entered [into a cognition] is such. (v. 347) Thus, precisely this [self-awareness] is accepted as object-cognition (*arthasaṃvid*), since the object itself (*arthātman*, i.e., an external object) is not perceived [directly]. The object [-form] that has entered into a cognition is the means for accomplishing (*sādhana*) this [self-awareness], [and] this [self-awareness] is the action (*kriyā*) for this [*sādhana*], (v. 348) because that [self-awareness] appears in the manner in which that [external] object enters [the cognition]. Since the determination of [external] objects (*arthasthiti*) has self-awareness (*svavid*) as [its] nature, [the result] is [generally] accepted to be "object-cognition" (*arthavid*), even though [it] is [actually] self-awareness. (v. 349) Therefore, there is also no *viśayabheda*. (v. 350a)<sup>12</sup>

Under the premise that one cannot perceive external objects directly, Dharmakīrti elaborates the arising process of perception in the following sequence: (I) the entry of the mental form of an external object into a cognition, (II) the accomplishment of the action of the self-awareness by means of this mental form, and (III) the determination of the external object in accordance with the self-awareness. In this process, the self-awareness plays the role for converting a datum given by an external object to an element that forms our determination of the object, the source of our everyday

"In this case, its (i.e., a cognition's) having the appearance of the object is the means of valid cognition. However, even though the nature of the subjective form exists, [it] does not depend on external objects, since [it] does not have other things [other than *grāhyākāra*] as [its] objects." Cf. [24, p. 31].

<sup>10</sup> *PV* III 350bcd: *svasaṃvedanaṃ phalam / uktaṃ svabhāvacintāyāṃ tādātmyād arthasaṃvidāḥ //*

"In the consideration of [a cognition's] own nature (*svabhāvacintā*), [Dignāga] claimed that self-awareness is the result because object-cognition has this [self-awareness] as [its] nature."

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *PVV* 223.19: ... *vārthasyātmākāra* ... ; *PVP* (D 225a1) : *don bdag nyid don gyi rnam pa'o //*. The same usage of the term *arthātman* is also found in *PV* III 267a: *arthātmā svātmabhūto*

<sup>12</sup> *PV* III 347-350a: *yasmād yathā niviṣṭo 'sāv arthātmā pratyaye tathā / niścīyate niviṣṭo 'sāv evam ity ātmasaṃvidāḥ //347// ity arthasaṃvit saiveṣṭā yato 'rthātmā na dṛśyate / tasyā buddhīniveśyarthāḥ sādhanaṃ tasya sā kriyā //348// yathā niviṣate so 'rthaḥ yataḥ sā prathate tathā / arthasthites tadātmatvāt svavid apy arthavin matā //349// tasmād viśayabhedo 'pi na*

activity. From the viewpoint of the determination, retrospectively, the self-awareness is conceived to be identical with the object-cognition.

This connection that the determination of an external object presupposes self-awareness, is more clearly presented in a parallel passage in Dharmakīrti's *PVin* I, which contains the additional condition "from the viewpoint of the result" (*kāryatas*).<sup>13</sup> Using this framework, while commenting on *PS* I 9d and its *Vṛtti*, Jinendrabuddhi, a follower of the Dharmakīrti tradition, clarifies the connection as follows:

[The purpose of Dignāga's statement is that an external object is cognized by means of this *viśayākārātā*.] For this self-awareness causes the determination of [the external] object (*arthaniścaya*), which is the result of the object-cognition (*arthasaṃvid*). Therefore, [as Dharmakīrti has stated, this self-awareness] should be seen [here], from the viewpoint of the result, as the object-cognition itself — metaphorically. In order to bring out this meaning, [*PS* I 9d and its *Vṛtti*] are stated in this way [by Dignāga]. For, in this manner, there is no *viśayabheda* between the means of valid cognition and [its] result...<sup>14</sup>

In this account, Jinendrabuddhi distinguishes the object-cognition (*arthasaṃvid*) from the determination of an external object (*arthaniścaya*) and explains that the latter is a common result of both object-cognition and self-awareness. From this viewpoint of the result, its two causes, viz. self-awareness and object-cognition, cannot be distinguished from one another. Therefore, one can understand the term "object-awareness" to be a metaphor for self-awareness. On such a metaphorical level, the means of valid cognition, viz. cognition having the mental form of an external object, and its result, object-cognition, are both related to an external object, and thus, the fallacy of *viśayabheda* is avoided.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup>*PVin* I 37.4-6: *arthasthiteḥ svasaṃvedanarūpatvāt svaivid apīyam arthavid eva kāryato draṣṭavyā*. "Because the determination of an external object has self-awareness as its nature, even if this [cognition as the result] is self-awareness. from the viewpoint of the result, [it] should be considered to be nothing but the object-cognition."

<sup>14</sup>*PST* 73.5-8: *sā hi svasaṃvit, arthasaṃvido yat kāryam arthaniścayaḥ. tat karoti. ata upacārenārthasaṃvid eva kāryato draṣṭavyety amum artham sūcayitum evam uktam. evaṃ hi pramāṇaphalayoḥ viśayabhedo na bhavati ...* The underlined phrase is a citation of *PVin* I 37.6.

<sup>15</sup>The view that self-awareness is causally connected to the determination of an external object is also applied in Kamalaśīla's commentary on *TS* 1351cd, where he asserts "object-cognition" (*arthasaṃvitti*) to be the result of self-awareness (*tatkāryatva*). Cf. *TSP* 490.23f.: *nāpi bhinnaviśayatvaprasaṅgo yuktaḥ, yataḥ svasaṃvittir apy arthasaṃvittir iṣṭā, tatkāryatvāt, na tu tanmayatvena. svasaṃvittes (em. : -vittis ed.) tu tādrūpyād iti na virodhaḥ*. "The undesirable consequence that [the means of valid cognition and the result] have different objects (*bhinnaviśayatva*) is also not correct, because the self-awareness [as the result] is also accepted as the object-cognition. [This is] because [object-cognition] is the result of this [self-awareness] (*tatkāryatva*), but not because [object-cognition] consists of this [self-cognition] (*tanmayatva*). However, [to say] 'because the

model	<i>prameya</i>	<i>pramāṇa</i>	<i>phala</i>	<i>phalaphala</i>
Jinendrabuddhi's model	( <i>bahirartha</i> )	<i>viśayākārātā</i>	<i>svasaṃvid</i> (= <i>arthasaṃvid</i> )	<i>arthaniścaya</i>

To a certain extent, this causal relationship between self-awareness and object-determination is comparable with the type of sense data theory which assumes that sense data provide our only access to external material objects. This access is explained in two ways: representationalism asserts that material objects are causally connected to sense data, and hence one can infer them from sense data that represent material objects. Phenomenalism, on the other hand, insists that a material object is constructed by these sense data. On the surface, both arguments are applicable to Dharmakīrti's discussion;<sup>16</sup> yet there is an important difference. Unlike sense data, which function only in order to secure the foundation of empirical knowledge, *ākāra* in Dharmakīrti's system is closely related to the theory of self-awareness. According to Dharmakīrti, self-awareness serves to generate our ascertainment of external objects; alternatively, self-awareness distinguishes itself from this ascertainment of external objects. Of these two alternatives, for Dharmakīrti the latter is more important for establishing his final position, Yogācāra idealism.

#### 4 Idealistic interpretation

Still another approach to the problem of *viśayabheda* reflects this idealistic point of view. Instead of proposing a causal relation between self-awareness and object-cognition, Prajñākaragupta, a commentator on the PV, distinguishes sharply between the two by using the theory of two truths: object-cognition on the conventional level, and self-awareness on the ultimate level. In this manner, in contrast to the causal account that unifies the two possible results by force, Prajñākaragupta aims to separate them from one another in order to make two different *pramāṇa-phala* relationships at two different levels clear. After having introduced the objection concerning *viśayabheda*,<sup>17</sup> he comments on PV III 349 as follows:

self-awareness has the nature of this [object-cognition]' is not contradictory [to the above explanation]"

<sup>16</sup>For instance, commenting on the term *niścīyate* in 347c, Devendrabuddhi glosses it as "inferred" (*rjes su dpog par 'gyur ro*). If one follows this interpretation, what is meant by the verse is similar to the account of representationalism, in which an external object can be inferred from the mental form that is caused by that object.

<sup>17</sup>Cf. PVA Bh 394.17f.: *evaṃ tarhi bāhye 'rthe pramāṇam ākāraḥ, saṃvedanaṃ tu svarūpe phalaṃ pravṛttam iti viśayabhedaḥ*. "Then, in this manner, the mental form is the means of valid cognition with respect to an external object; yet self-awareness occurs as the result with respect to [cognition's] own nature. Thus, there is [the fallacy of] *viśayabheda*."

Ultimately (*paramāthataḥ*),<sup>18</sup> this [cognition] is self-awareness, and conventionally (*vyavahāratas*) [it is] object-cognition. Therefore, regarding everyday activity, the result [occurs] only with respect to an [external] object (*artha*), and the means of valid cognition [occurs] only with respect to [the same external] object. Therefore, how [could] *viṣayabheda* [occur]? Also regarding the ultimate [perception], the two (i.e., the result and the means of valid cognition) [occur] with respect to the own nature (*svarūpa*) [of cognition, and here there is also no *viṣayabheda*].<sup>19</sup>

A strong emphasis on the difference between an external object (*artha*) and the cognition's own nature (*svarūpa*) constitutes one essential feature of Prajñākaragupta's commentary on PV III. For instance, commenting on PV III 287, he distinguishes between the two concepts from the viewpoint of their different relationships to the definition of perception: cognition's own nature, which has a clear form (*spaṣṭākāra*), becomes the object of the cognition free of conceptualization (*nirvikalpaka*) and without error (*abhrānta*); the external object, which has an unclear form, on the other hand, relates to the cognition with conceptualization and error.<sup>20</sup> Whereas the former is concerned with self-awareness, the ultimate perception, the latter is concerned with object-cognition, conventional perception, for such an object-cognition presupposes the conceptualization of an external object that differs from cognition's own nature.<sup>21</sup> On the basis of the same kind of distinction, Prajñākaragupta constructs his interpretation of PV III 347-350, including the above argument, in which we can find his consistent rejection of any causal relationship between self-awareness and object-cognition.<sup>22</sup> According to his interpretation, before we reach the idealistic understanding that only the self-awareness of a cognition's own nature is

<sup>18</sup>Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin also use the concept of *paramārtha* in this context. Cf. PVP (D 225a6f): *don dam par 'dir rang rigs yin na yang / 'on kyang cha 'di tsaṃ gyis nye bar btags nas / don rig 'dol*/. PVV 224.6f.: *paramārthataḥ svaivid api satī arthavid matā. svasaṃvedanam evārthavedanam upacārād ucyaṭa iti tādātmyam anayoḥ*.

<sup>19</sup>Cf. PVABh 394.22f.: *svavid eveyaṃ paramārthataḥ. vyavahāratō 'rthavit. tato vyavahārāpekṣayārtha eva phalam, artha eva pramāṇam iti kuto viṣayabhedaḥ. paramārthāpekṣayāpi svarūpe dvayam api*.

<sup>20</sup>Cf. PVABh 331.13f.: *svarūpaṃ tad eva spaṣṭākāram, arthas tu na tathā. tataḥ svarūpe tan nirvikalpakaṃ, arthe tat savikalpakaṃ iti ... svarūpe tad abhrāntam, arthe bhrāntam iti...*

<sup>21</sup>On the basis of this distinction, Prajñākaragupta insists that the two qualifiers in the definition of perception, viz. being free of conceptualization and non-erroneous, indicate the same contents. Cf. PVABh 252.29-253.2. For Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of the qualifier *abhrānta* and its theoretical background, including its relation to *artha* and *svarūpa*, cf. [13].

<sup>22</sup>For this reason, Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of PV III 347-348ab contains a crucial difference from other commentators' interpretations. Unlike other commentators, he does not construe *ātmasaṃvedan* in 347d with the previous phrase *niviṣṭo 'sāu evam*



real, there is no room for self-awareness in everyday cognition.<sup>23</sup> Only after we understand this ultimate reality can we realize that something we wrongly thought to be object-cognition concerning an external object was nothing but self-awareness concerning cognition's own nature. In this manner, by disconnecting self-awareness from external objects, the fallacy of *viśayabheda* is avoided.

model	<i>prameya</i>	<i>pramāṇa</i>	<i>phala</i>
Prajñākaragupta's model	<i>bahīrārtha</i> ( <i>jñāna</i> ) <i>svarūpa</i>	( <i>viśayākāratā</i> ) ( <i>grāhakākāra</i> )	<i>arthasaṃvid</i> <i>svasaṃvid</i>

## 5 Conclusion

Modern analytical philosophers and Buddhist *pramāṇa* theories attempt to bridge the gap between internal and external objects, that is, between sense data and material objects, or *jñānākāra* and *bāhyārtha*, albeit in different contexts. For modern Cartesian philosophers, this problem is closely connected to their common project of the foundation of empirical knowledge. Whether they adopt representationalism or phenomenism, indubitable sense data are considered to be a starting point for justifying our common belief in the existence of the material world. In ancient India, on

ity, but with the following verse. Therefore, in contrast to 347abc, in which the determination of an external object through its mental form is explained, 347d-348ab are interpreted as showing self-awareness as the result of perception. Cf. *PVABh* 394.15: *tasmāt svarūpapratyakṣatvād arthasyāsaṃvedanāt svasaṃvedanaṃ phalam*. According to this interpretation, these verses could be translated as follows: "[The means of valid cognition is *arthābhāsātā*] because [an external object] is determined (i.e., conceptualized, cf. *PVABh* 394.9: *arthakalpanā*) [in the form:] 'This has entered in this manner,' just as this nature of the object (i.e., the mental form of the object), which has entered into a cognition. [However, ultimately, self-awareness is the result of perception] because [cognition's] own nature is cognized (*ātmasaṃvidah*). Thus, only this [self-awareness] is accepted as object-cognition since the object itself is not perceived directly."

<sup>23</sup>In the recent article [22], J. Tanizawa has pointed out a tendency towards a kind of direct realism in Dharmakīrti's theory of perception in his distinguishing between two phases of perception: perception of an external object in the first phase and self-awareness in the second phase. If one applies this idea to Prajñākaragupta's above interpretation, the first phase corresponds to the conventional level, and the second, to the ultimate level. If one accepts this division, it must be explained how one perceives an external objects without introducing self-awareness. In this regard, Bhāviveka's *MHK* V 25-26 provides us an example that explains perception purely by means of *arthābhāsātā*: *bibhratā jāyamānena jñānena viśayābhatām / pramīyate prameyaṃ yat pramāṇaṃ tena tan matam //25// tannirvṛttau ca dṛṣṭavāt tannirvṛttiḥ phalaṃ matam / amīdārśanarūpasya tathāivādhiḡamo yataḥ //26//*

"An object is cognized by a cognition that arises bearing object-form. Therefore, this [cognition] is accepted as a means of valid cognition. And since [the object] is seen [at the moment] when this [cognition] is accomplished, its accomplishment is accepted to be the result, since an inexpressible nature is apprehended in just this manner." For these verses, see [8, p. 110] and [14]

the other hand, Dharmakīrti dealt with a similar problem in the context of defending Dignāga's doctrines of self-awareness and the non-difference between the means of valid cognition and its result. In replying to Kumārila's criticism, which points out the fallacy of *viśayabheda*, Dharmakīrti explains that self-awareness, which is the result of perceiving an external object through its mental form, causally relates to the cognition of an external object. In this causal explanation, the object-determination that is caused by self-awareness leads us to everyday activities concerning external objects, which are to be appropriated or to be abandoned. However, unlike sense data, which become the basis of empirical knowledge, *ākāra*, i.e., the mental form, cannot alone take on such a role. It is only in combination with self-awareness that mental form can be considered significant for producing the determination of an external object. Moreover, as we have seen in Prajñākaragupta's interpretation, self-awareness is firmly embedded in Yogācāra idealism, where the dichotomy of the internal/external object no longer plays a role. Through philosophical investigation and religious practice of mind, Buddhist *pramāṇa* theorists aimed to reach the state of Mind-only. Therefore, they do not satisfy themselves with sense data, but rather proclaim that self-awareness is the goal to be attained over and above our empirical knowledge.

## Primary Sources

*Kāś.* = Sucarita Miśra, *Kāśikā*, in: [17].

*TSP.* = Kamalaśīla, *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, in: [18].

*PV III.* = Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika*, in: [24, Chapter III].

*PVABh.* = Prajñākaragupta, *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkārabhāṣya*, in: [15].

*PVP.* = Devendrabuddhi, *\*Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā, Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel pa*, in: [3].

*PVV.* = Manorathanandin, *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*, in: [16].

*PVin I.* = Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, in: [20, Chapter I] (*pratyakṣa*).

*PS.* = Dignāga, *Pramāṇasamuccaya (-vṛtti)*, in: [7, Chapter I].

*PST.* = Jinendrabuddhi, *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, in: [19].

*MHK V.* = Bhāviveka, *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (Chapter V), in: [5].

*ŚV.* = Kumārila, *Ślokovārttika*, chapter on *pratyakṣa*, in: [21].

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