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On *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana**

1. In the Buddhist analysis of logical reasons (*hetu/linga/sādhana*), four types of contradictory reasons (*viruddha*) are documented in Śāṅkarasvāmin's (500-560) Nyāyapraveśa[ka], that is, those that prove the opposite of the nature of the property (*dharma*) to be proved (*dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana*), those that prove the opposite of a specific quality of the *dharma* (*dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana*), those that prove the opposite of the nature of the subject (*dharmin*) (*dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*), and those that prove the opposite of a specific quality of the subject (*dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*).¹

Of the four types, the first one is standard. For instance, for proving sound's permanence, the two reasons "being produced" (*kṛtakatva*) and "arising immediately after a mental effort" (*prayatnānantarīyatva*) are contradictory to the property "permanence", because both reasons fail to fulfill the second and third conditions for being a valid reason, namely the reason's presence in similar instances (*sapakṣe sattvam*) and its complete absence from dissimilar instances (*vipakṣe 'sattvam*). However, the other three types of contradictory reasons fulfill the set of three conditions (*trairūpya*) for being a valid reason, at least superficially, as for instance in the well-known proof of the existence of a soul (*puruṣa*) according to Sāṅkhya which is adduced by Śāṅkarasvāmin to illustrate the second type of contradictory reason:²

[Sense faculties] such as the sense of vision are for the benefit of something else (*parārtha*), because they are aggregates, like the individual parts of a bed and a chair.

In this proof, the reason "being an aggregate" (*saṅghātatva*) fulfills the triple condition for being a valid reason. However, when one considers the Sāṅkhya's intention and realizes that its implicit target is to prove a "soul" (*puruṣa*) implied by the expression "something else" (*para*), the reason becomes contradictory because, as the example clarifies, the reason proves only "being for the benefit of something else that is an aggregate", like the body, but not "being for the benefit of something else that is not an aggregate", like the soul.

* I would like to thank Prof. Eli Franco and Prof. Karin Preisendanz for their valuable comments on a draft of this paper. This study was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant No. 15H03155.

¹ Except for the translation of *svarūpa*, the translations of these four technical terms are adopted from Tillemans 2000: 52.

² *parāthās cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātātvaṅ chayanāsanādyāṅgavad iti* (NP 7.8-9). For a translation, see Tachikawa 1971: 125-126. For a detailed explanation of this proof, see Watanabe 2008.

The same happens in the case of the third and fourth types of contradictory reason, both of which are revealed to be incompatible with the nature of the subject of the thesis (*dharmin*) or its specific quality (*dharmiviśeṣa*). The proof that Śāṅkarasvāmin offers in order to explain the third type of contradictory reason is connected with the Vaiśeṣika concept of “existence”:³

Existence (*bhāva*) is not a substance, not a quality [and] not a motion because it has a single substance (i.e., it is present in a single substance)⁴ and because it is present in qualities and motions, like specific universals (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*).

Although the combined reason fulfills the triple condition for being a valid reason, it supposedly leads to a conclusion that is opposite to the Vaiśeṣika’s intention and notion of “existence”. The same combined reason also proves the opposite of a specific quality of “existence” assumed by the Vaiśeṣika, namely, “being the cause of the notion of ‘existent’” (*satpratya-yakartrtva*).

Among the above four types of contradictory reasons, the third and fourth are problematic inasmuch as there is some uncertainty about the exact procedure of concluding the opposites of *dharmisvarūpa* and *dharmiviśeṣa* from the ostensibly valid reason. In particular, it is unclear why the combined reason of the Vaiśeṣika proof proves the opposite of the nature of “existence”⁵ and how the faulty reason called *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* differs from the one called “[the reason that] is not established as regards the locus” (*āśrayāsiddha*).⁶ In this paper, I will try to solve these problems through exploring relevant Indian and Chinese materials on the issue by Śāṅkarasvāmin, Kuiji (窺基 632-682), Jinendrabuddhi (c. 710-770), and Haribhadrasūri (ca. 8th century).

2. Let me start with Dignāga’s explanation of the reason why a specific type of faulty reason should be called *viruddha* in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS 3.27):⁷

³ *na dravyaṃ na karma na guṇo bhāva iti, ekadravyavattvāt guṇakarmasu ca bhāvāt, sāmānyaviśeṣavad iti* (NP 7.12-14). For a translation, see Tachikawa 1971: 126 and below, p. 6. For the background of the proof, see VS 1.2.8-10 and Halbfass 1992: 140.

⁴ That is, it is neither a constituent substance that does not inhere in any other substance, like an atom, nor a composed substance that inheres in more than one substance, like a pot.

⁵ For instance, Ui (1944: 262-263) explains that since the Vaiśeṣika proof is an application of *pariśeṣa*, *bhāva* which is not classified as either of the three categories, namely, *dravya*, *guṇa*, and *karma*, should consequently be nonexistent. However, the presumption that something that cannot be classified as being subsumed under these three categories does not exist appears unjustified.

⁶ For a summary of the early terminology used for this type of faulty reason, see Preisendanz 1994: II/176-177.

⁷ For the Sanskrit text of the PS and its auto-commentary, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*vṛtti, I am referring to the reconstruction of chapter 3 by Shōryū Katsura and Toshikazu Watanabe. I am grateful to Prof. Katsura and Dr. Watanabe for providing me with a copy of their edition of Jinendrabuddhi’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya*ṭīkā, Chapter 3, which has been supplemented with their recon-

*dharmadharmisvarūpasya tadviśeṣasya caiva saḥ*⁸ /
*viparītopakāritvād viruddho 'sati bādhane*⁹ /27/

Since this [kind of reason] serves [to prove] the opposite of the *dharmā* and the *dharmīn* themselves as well as [the opposite] of their specific qualities, [it is] contradictory, inasmuch as [the thesis] is not invalidated [by a means of valid cognition].

Commenting on this verse, Dignāga provides the following account of a reason that proves the opposite of *dharmisvarūpa* and *dharmiviśeṣa* (PSV *ad* PS 3.27):

tathādr̥ṣṭabādhano dharmisvarūpaviśeṣaviparyayasādhanād viruddho vaktavyaḥ
– yathā prayatnānantarīyakatvād aśabdaḥ, aśrāvaṇaś ceti. ubhayaṃ hi sādhyam,
dharmaviśiṣṭadharmināḥ sādhyatvāt. tatrobhayasya vaikasya vā svarūpaviśeṣa-
*viparyayasādhanād viruddhatvaṃ yuktam.*¹⁰

In the same manner [as the reason that refutes what is intended (*iṣṭavighātakṛt*)], [this reason,] inasmuch as an invalidation [of its thesis] is not seen (**adr̥ṣṭabādhana*), should be called “contradictory” because it proves the opposite of the nature of the subject or [its] specific quality, for instance, “[Sound] is not sound because it arises immediately after a mental effort”, or “[Sound] is not audible because it arises immediately after a mental effort”. For in this [case not only the property alone, but] both [subject and property] are to be proved since what is to be proved is a subject that is qualified by a property. Since [this type of reason] proves the opposite of the nature or a specific quality of both of them (i.e., the *dharmā* and the *dharmīn*) or either [of them], it is reasonable [to say] that it is contradictory.

Here Dignāga offers two theses, “Sound is not sound” and “Sound is not audible”, as examples of possible conclusions from the reason “arising immediately after a mental effort”. Of course, it should not be assumed that Dignāga considered the two arguments as typical reasonings involving a *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* and *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*, respectively, because we

struction of the PS(V) and an annotated Japanese translation. The verse PS 3.27 is almost identical with NM 2b 27-28: 邪證法有法 自性或差別 此成相違因 若無所違害. For a Japanese translation of the NM passage, see Katsura 1979: 78-79.

⁸ The last part, *caiva saḥ*, which has no Tibetan equivalent, is provisionally assumed by the editors. They do not refer to the source of their assumption; however, it may be the parallel expression in the NM where we find *ci* (此) “this”.

⁹ This reconstruction of the phrase *'sati bādhane* follows Kanakavarman’s Tibetan translation of the PS and the parallel passage in the NM, namely, *ruo wu suo wei hai* (若無所違害). As the editors have noted, TSP (*ad* TS 1941) 664.13-14 also supports this reconstruction of the wording. Vasudhararakṣita’s Tibetan translation of the PS, on the other hand, and Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary suggest *viruddhaḥ sati bādhane*. Furthermore, Ejima (1980: 197, n. 35) noted that possibly Sthiramati may also have relied on the latter version of this verse of the PS.

¹⁰ For the Tibetan translations of this passage, see Kitagawa 1965: 500f. The reading *tathādr̥ṣṭabādhano*, instead of *tathā dr̥ṣṭabādhano* as found in the preliminary reconstruction of PSV *ad* PS 3.27, has kindly been suggested by Prof. Preisendanz.

can hardly imagine anyone who would present such absurd claims. Even if such claims had been made, one could have easily rejected them by pointing out that they involve faulty theses (*pakṣābhāsa*), without appeal to the two types of contradictory reason.¹¹

Accordingly, Jinendrabuddhi offers an example that is more appropriate: “Ether and other [entities] are permanent (i.e., eternal) because of the absence of the property of something impermanent” (*nityam ākāśādikam, anityadharmābhāvāt*).¹² The reason fulfills the triple condition for being a valid reason. However, if one analyzes this reason and finds that it also implies “causal efficacy” (*arthakriyāsāmarthyā*) as a property of something impermanent, following Dharmakīrti’s argument that (only) momentary entities possess causal efficacy, the reason implicitly proves that the subject, namely, ether and similar entities, is non-existent because causal efficacy which defines existence is not found in it. In other words, Jinendrabuddhi seems to understand that a *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* occurs only when a proof is based on a reason that implies the negation of the existence of the subject in reality. In this case, however, there is a problem: How can we distinguish this faulty reason from another faulty reason, namely, the one that is not established as regards its locus (*āśrayāsiddha*)?¹³ Jinendrabuddhi notices this problem and addresses the distinction between the two faulty reasons (PST Ms B 135b 6-7):

nanu dharmisvarūpanirākarāṇa āśrayāsiddho hetuḥ syāt. naitad asti. atra hi vyavacchedamātram hetutvenopāttam. tasya cāvastubhūto 'py āśrayo 'viruddha eva. sarvatra cāyam eva dharmisvarūpaviparyayasādhanasya viṣayaḥ, yatra vastubhūto dharmā¹⁴ upādīyate, hetus tu dharmavyavacchedamātram. tenedam acodyam eva.

[Objection:] If it negates the subject itself (i.e., its own locus), the reason should be the [faulty] one that is not established as regards its locus (*āśrayāsiddha*).

[Reply:] This is not the case, because here (i.e., in the proof of the permanence of ether, etc.) mere exclusion (*vyavacchedamātra*) is adopted as the reason. And [thus] the locus of this [reason], even though it does not exist in reality, is not at all contradicted. And when a property that exists in reality is adopted, but the

¹¹ On this point, Kitagawa and Katsura consider Dignāga’s examples of arguments involving the two types of contradictory reason as restatements of arguments with faulty theses. See Kitagawa 1965: 211-213 & 215, n. 417, and Katsura 1979: 79-81.

¹² For this statement and its wider context see PST Ms B 135b 3-6. Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation of the proof is found on 135b 5-6: *tathā hy arthakriyāsāmarthyam apy anityadharmāḥ, yadi tad apy ākāśāder nāsti, vastubhūtatvam eva tasya na syāt, arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ.*

¹³ For the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha*, see Funayama 1991, Preisendanz 1994: 173-180, and Tillemans 1999: 171ff.

¹⁴ Although the Tibetan translation (*chos can*) suggests the reading *dharmy*, I follow the draft edition of Katsura and Watanabe who prefer the reading *dharmā* found in the manuscript.

reason is the mere exclusion of the property, precisely this is the scope of the *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* in all cases. Therefore, this (i.e., the usage of this example to illustrate a *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*) should definitely not be criticized.

From the Buddhist viewpoint, the subject of the opponent's proof, ether, etc., is a fictitious entity. Thus one might argue that the opponent's reason is actually a faulty reason of the *āśrayāsiddha* type as its subject is not established. However, the faulty reason under discussion called *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* is a different case. When the Buddhist criticizes the Vaiśeṣika proof of the permanence of ether, etc., he refers to the reason adduced by the Vaiśeṣika, namely, *anityadharmābhāva*, as indicating the mere exclusion of a property, in the present case the property of something that is impermanent. When such a type of reason is used, the subject in which it occurs may be fictitious from his (the Buddhist's) own point of view and is not contradicted by that much. The non-existence of the subject rather results from the Buddhist's further analysis of the Vaiśeṣika's statement of the reason: there "the property of something that is impermanent" includes a property that really exists from the Buddhist's point of view, namely, causal efficacy, whose lack in the subject of the Vaiśeṣika's inference actually proves its non-existence.¹⁵ In this manner, Jinendrabuddhi distinguishes this faulty reason from the *āśrayāsiddha* type of faulty reason.

3. Compared to Jinendrabuddhi's example for the *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* type of contradictory reason, Śāṅkarasvāmin's example for the same has a different focus. While the former shows that such a faulty reason may negate the existence of its subject, the latter shows that it may negate the essence of its subject. For instance, when a Vaiśeṣika claims that "existence (*bhāva*) is not a substance, not a quality [and] not a motion because it has a single substance (i.e., it is present in a single substance) and because it is present in qualities and

¹⁵ Since the reason consists in the exclusion of something else, the property expressed by it may relate not only to existent entities but also to non-existent entities and entities that are both existent and non-existent. Cf. PV 1.205 and Steinkellner 2013: I/91 and II/283-285 (n. 590-591). In his commentary on CŚ 9.4, where an opponent's proof of permanence from the reason "absence of being produced" is controverted, Dharmapāla also refers to three kinds of reasons (因) expressed by the exclusion of something else (遮遣餘有類物), that is, a property that has an existent entity as its body (有體法), like "being produced", a property that has a non-existent entity as its body (無體法), like "absence of being produced", and a property that partakes of both [existent and non-existent entities as its body] (通二法), like "being cognizable" (所知). Using this classification, Dharmapāla maintains that the reason "absence of being produced" can refute the nature of the subject, namely, the nature of being a permanent entity that is claimed by an opponent. Cf. DGBSL 188b 8-16.

motions, like specific universals”,¹⁶ the proponent can criticize this proof by pointing out that the reason proves that “existence” is not “existence”.

Before explaining the point, let me briefly examine the structure of the proof. Among the three components of the reason, the component “having a single substance” (*ekadravyavattva*) serves to distinguish the subject from “substance”, which, according to classical Vaiśeṣika ontology, may be divided into two types, namely, the permanent type such as atoms, the soul, mind, time, and space, and the impermanent type such as empirical objects like pots. While the former type is *adravya*, namely, not composed of any further substances, the latter is *anekadravya*, namely, composed of two atoms and further composite substances. Because there is no third type of substance, the property “having a single substance” necessarily indicates that entities that possess it belong to a category different from substance. Likewise, the second component of the reason, “being present in qualities” (**guṇeṣu bhāvaḥ*), indicates that entities that possess this property cannot be classified as qualities; the third component, “being present in motions” (**karmasu bhāvaḥ*), indicates that entities that possess this property are different from motion. To sum up, the tripartite proof implies that “existence” constitutes a category different from the categories substance, quality and motion.

Relating to this Vaiśeṣika proof, Śāṅkarasvāmin points out that each component of the reason applied in the proof actually proves that “existence” is not “existence” (*bhāvasyābhāvatvam* [NP 39.18]). On this passage, Haribhadrāsūri, a Jain scholar of the eighth century, provides a detailed analysis and clarifies its meaning. Referring to the component *ekadravyavattva*, he explains that from the Vaiśeṣika viewpoint it shows that the subject “existence” is different from substance, but at the same time, from another viewpoint, the property can also be employed to show that “existence” is not “existence” (i.e., the supreme universal).¹⁷ That is to say, the property *ekadravyavattva* is present only in similar instances like substance-ness, which are definitely not “existence”; since there is no dissimilar instance except for “existence” itself, the property fulfills the third condition for being a valid reason.¹⁸ In this manner, the component *ekadra-*

¹⁶ For the text, see n. 3. For another example of the *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* type of the faulty contradictory reason, see the one adduced by Kumāri in SV *anumāna* 100cd-102ab. On this, see Yamakami et al. 1985: 40-42.

¹⁷ *bhāvo bhāva eva na bhavati ekadravyavattvāt dravyatvatvat* (NPT 42.14f.). The sub-commentator Pārśvadevaṅgi interprets “existence” as referring to “the supreme universal” (*mahāsāmānya*) and distinguishes it from intermediate universals (*avāntarasāmānya*) like substance-ness (*dravyatva*). Cf. NPVP 104.25-27.

¹⁸ Prof. Preisendanz kindly informs me that if the third condition is fulfilled because there are no dissimilar instances this would be a *kevalānvayihetu* according to Uddyotakara’s terminology. I will further examine this point on another occasion.

vyavattva validly proves that “existence” is not “existence”. The same procedure may also be applied to the other two components. Therefore, the combined reason of the Vaiśeṣika proof of “existence” should be called a faulty reason of the *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* type.

Interestingly, about a century before Haribhadra’s explanation, almost the same explanation is found in the *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* (因明入正理論疏) of Kuiji (窺基 632-682), the prominent disciple of Xuanzang (玄奘 602-664).¹⁹ In the Chinese commentary on the NP, Kuiji explains the *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*, starting with some background narrative relating to the Vaiśeṣika proof of “existence”. According to this story, Ulūka (i.e., Kaṇāda, the legendary founder of the Vaiśeṣika) once met a talented disciple by name of Pañcaśikha and gave him instruction on the arcane elements of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. In the course of their dialogue, Pañcaśikha was able to grasp the entire system of categories except for “supreme existence” (大有, **mahāsattā*). Since Pañcaśikha did not understand why it should be different from substance, etc., Ulūka presented the proof under discussion in order to make his disciple understand this difference. Having heard the inference, Pañcaśikha also believed in this part of Ulūka’s teaching.²⁰

After having presented the narrative, Kuiji states that Dignāga pointed out a flaw in Ulūka’s proof because the combined reason proves that “existence” is not “existence” (彼有性而非有性). Like Haribhadrasūri, Kuiji also understands that the reason fulfills the three conditions for being a valid reason but proves the opposite of the nature of the subject, quite contrary to the Vaiśeṣika’s intention to effect the acceptance of “existence” as an independent category besides substance, etc.

4. As becomes clear from the expositions by Haribhadra and Kuiji, even though the Vaiśeṣika intends to claim that “existence” is different from substance, etc., another conclusion, namely, that “existence” is not “existence”, may also be drawn from the reason employed by the Vaiśeṣika. Across the cultural gap between India and China, the two commentators had almost the same opinion about the interpretation of this faulty reason. However, the similarity of their understanding extends beyond this. The two commentators also share a similar opinion on the problem of the overapplication of the notion of the *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*.

¹⁹ For the *yinming* tradition in East Asia, see Takemura 1986, Frankenhauser 1996 and Inami 2011. For Kuiji’s understanding of another logical/dialectical concept, the faulty reason called *viruddhāvyaḥicārin*, see Moriyama 2014.

²⁰ Cf. YRZLS 129c 26 – 130c 11.

Commenting on the Vaiśeṣika proof of “existence”, Haribhadra introduces the objection that in all cases every reason may be contradictory with regard to a specific quality of the subject.²¹ That is, even when someone presents a valid inference, such as “Sound is impermanent, because it is produced, like a pot”, one may point out that the reason employed in it may also prove a clearly contradicted thesis, such as “Sound can be baked (*pākya*)”, because it is present in similar instances like a pot, which indeed can be baked. To this, Haribhadra replies that objecting to such a contradictory thesis comes to an end when one refers to other similar instances like a cloth, which are impermanent but cannot be baked.²² However, what would happen if someone would point out that instead of “Sound cannot be baked” one may conclude “Sound is not sound” from the reason “being produced”? Is this not also a case of a *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*? Although Haribhadra seems to have noticed the problem, he does not provide any discussion on the issue.

Unlike Haribhadra, Kuiji explicitly addresses the problem of the overapplication of the notion of *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* in the following question and reply (YRZLS 131a6-13):

問：若爾，立聲爲無常，宗聲體可聞，瓶有燒見。其瓶與聲應成異品。若許爲異，不但違論，亦一切宗皆無同品。答：豈不已說。其聲之體非所諍故，聲上無常是所成立。瓶既同有，故是同品。彼說離實有體有性爲宗有法，以有一實因所成立。同異既非離實有體之有性。故成於異品。

Question: If so (i.e., if the reason employed by the Vaiśeṣika is the faulty reason called *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*), [an undesirable consequence follows:] When someone presents [the thesis] “Sound is impermanent”, and [takes] the nature of the subject, [namely,] the “audibility” of sound [into consideration], a pot, which is observed to be bakeable, would be an instance dissimilar to sound [which is qualified by “audibility”]. If one accepts [the pot] as a dissimilar instance, it does not contradict [Śāṅkarasvāmin’s] argument, and it [furthermore] results that no subject has a similar instance.

Reply: Has this not already been explained? Since the nature of sound is not disputed now, [only] the impermanence of sound is to be proved. Since [impermanence] likewise exists in a pot, it is a similar instance. He (i.e., Ulūka) stated “existence” that has the nature of existence independent from substance [and the other categories] as the subject, namely, as that which is to be proved by the reason “having a single substance”. [However,] the specific universals (同異,

²¹ NPT 43.2-3.

²² *na, virodhino 'dhikṛtahetvanvitadrṣṭāntārabalenaiva nivr̥tteḥ. tathā hi, anityaḥ śabdah kṛtakatvād ghaṭavat, ity atra pākyaḥ śabda iti viruddhacodanāyāṃ* (v.l. ms. R: *-nodanāyāṃ* ed.) *kṛtakatvānvitāpākyaapaṭādidrṣṭāntārasāmarthyāt tannivr̥tṭyā na viruddhatā* (NPT 43.3-5). The variant reading *viruddhacodanāyāṃ* recorded in NP 128.18 is seen in a manuscript preserved in the Śrī Rūpavijayaḥi Dāhelāno Jaina Upāśraya whose variants have been collected by the editor, Muni Jambuvijaya, in an appendix of NP.

**sāmānyaviśeṣa*) are not “existence” that has the nature of existence independent from substance [and the other categories in the first place]. Therefore, [the reason “having a single substance”] is established in dissimilar instances [such as specific universals].

The question is crucial. It implies that even a valid reasoning can be criticized by charging it to be an instance of the use of the faulty reason called *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*. With some modifications, we can reconstruct the above argument in the following manner: If someone presents a proof of the impermanence of sound, one may say that the reason “being produced” leads to a fallacy because from the same reason one may come to a different conclusion that contradicts the nature of the subject: “Sound is not audible, because it is produced, like a pot”. The reason fulfills the three conditions for being a valid reason: the reason is present in the subject; the reason is present in similar instances, such as a pot, which is inaudible; the reason is also completely absent from dissimilar instances because there is no dissimilar instance of an entity that is not inaudible except the subject itself. The structure of the argument is the same as that of the one used for attacking the Vaiśeṣika proof of “existence”. Thus, by applying this schema, it is theoretically possible to accuse every proof of involving a faulty reason of the *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* type.²³

Kuīji’s answer to this question emphasizes the difference between the two cases: In the case of the proof of the impermanence of sound, the audibility of sound does not form the topic of discussion. In the case of the Vaiśeṣika proof of “existence”, however, Ulūka intends to establish the nature of “existence” as a consequence implicitly resulting from the proof. That is, one needs to take the main issue of a debate between two parties into consideration and thus determine the actual topic under discussion. Only when a debater intends to prove the nature of the subject of inference, such as that of the supreme universal called “existence”, something which may not be obvious but rather hidden because of the specific mode of expression of the thesis, can one point out the use of a faulty reason of the *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* type, but not in every case of proof.

²³ If someone presents a proof “*p* possesses *S*, because of *H*, like *sd*”, there must be another conclusion that contradicts the nature of the subject, namely, “*p* possesses non-*P*-ness, because of *H*, like *sd*”. For instance, one can substitute “sound” for *p*, “impermanence” for *S*, “being produced” for *H*, “pot” for *sd*, and “audibility” for *P*-ness. The same procedure can be extended to every proof. This point is clearly expressed by Oetke (1994: 37): “For any *pakṣa* *p* we could derive that *p* exhibits the property corresponding to the predicate ‘*x*≠*p*’ from any logical reason ‘*H*’ fulfilling the *Trairūpya*-conditions in their restrictive form”.

5. Thus, the questions about the *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* posed at the beginning of this paper have been answered. Before the conclusion of this examination, some words on Dharmakīrti's silence on the issue are due. As is well known, in his *Nyāyabindu*, in spite of his knowledge of Dignāga's detailed classification of the contradictory reason, Dharmakīrti insists only on its standard types and does not mention the *dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana* and *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana* types (NB 3.90-92). Although his true intention remains obscure, on the basis of the above examination we may deduce two reasons for his silence.²⁴

First, as we have seen, the faulty reason called *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* may occur in all cases of proof because one can always formulate an argument that demonstrates a property that is opposed to the nature of the subject chosen by a debater. One of the reasons why this faulty reason may occur in every proof is that in Dignāga's system of logic the subject should be independent of both similar and dissimilar instances. As we have seen in Kuiji's exposition, in this system any valid inference relating to a subject *p* can easily be reformulated as an inference that proves the thesis "*p* is not *p*" on the basis of the very same reason which fulfills the three conditions for being a valid reason. Thus one may refute any proof furnished by an opponent by pointing out that its reason is actually an instance of the *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* type of a contradictory reason. Dharmakīrti may have been aware of the potential risk emanating from this notion and therefore have kept silent on the issue.

Second, this faulty reason is well understood in the situation of a debate where two parties with different religious convictions discuss various subject matters, such as – in the eyes of a Buddhist – fictitious entities like God and the soul. Pointing out that the reason employed by one's opponent actually proves the opposite of the nature of the subject of inference (*dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*) is part of an effective method of defeating one's opponent: one formulates a proof that demolishes the concept of the subject adduced by the opponent and even utilizes his own reason. However, at a time when scholarly intellectual activities were no longer closely connected with such traditions of debate, the discussion of this faulty reason may have become meaningless. Thus, it would be comprehensible that Dharmakīrti's rigorous logical system based on the Buddhist metaphysics of *vastu* ("really existing thing") and *svabhāva* ("own nature") has no place for the *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*. In other words,

²⁴ In spite of Dharmakīrti's influential silence, there are several references to the *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* in later literature, for instance in TSP 629.24 (*ad* TS 1842d: *viruddhā dharmibāadhanāt*): *dharmisvarūpaviparītasāadhanād viruddhā hetavaḥ*, with *dharmas-* of the edition emended to *dharmi-* in Shiga 2016: 93, n. 102. See Shiga 2016: 93 & 117.

the concept and the arguments related to it about which we learn in the Indian and Chinese works treated above are indicative of an aspect of Buddhist logic at a time when “logic” was still closely connected with “debate”.

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- DGBSL Dacheng guang bailun shi lun (大乘広百論釈論) of Dharmapāla: T 1571.
- NB Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti: *Pañḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottara-pradīpa* (Being a Subcommentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a Commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu), ed. by D. Malvania. [*Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series* 2]. Patna: Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1971.
- NM Nyāyamukha (因明正理門論) of Dignāga: T 1628.
- NP Nyāyapraveśa[ka] of Śāṅkarasvāmin: *Nyāyapraveśakaśāstra of Baudh Ācārya Dinnāga*. With the Commentary of Ācārya Haribhadrasūri and with the Subcommentary of Pārśvadevagaṇi ed. by Muni Jambuvijaya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass – Ahmedabad: Siddhibhuvan Manohar Jain Trust – Bhavnagar: Jain Atmanand Sabha, 2009.
- NPṬ Nyāyapraveśakaṭīkā Śiṣyahitā of Haribhadrasūri. See NP.
- NPVP Nyāyapraveśakavṛttipañjikā of Pārśvadevagaṇi. See NP.
- PS(V) 3 Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti) of Dignāga, Chapter 3: Unpublished draft reconstruction of the Sanskrit text by S. Katsura & T. Watanabe. For the Tibetan text, see Kitagawa 1965.
- PST Ms B Sanskrit manuscript of the PST used in the unpublished draft edition by S. Katsura and T. Watanabe. See MacDonald 2005: xiii-xv.
- PV 1 Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti of Dharmakīrti: *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary*. Text and Critical Notes, ed. by R. Gnoli. [*Serie Orientale Roma* 23]. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960.
- ŚV Ślokavārttika of Kumārilabhaṭṭa: *The Mīmāṃsā-Śloka-Vartika of Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Called Nyāyaratnākara by Pārtha Sārathi Miśra*, ed. by Rāma Sāstri Tailaṅga. [*Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series* 3]. Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book-Depot, 1898.
- T Taishō shinshū daizōkyō
- TS *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary "Pañjikā" of Shri Kamalashīla*, ed. by Dwarikadās Shastri. 2 vols. [*Bauddha Bharati Series* 1-2]. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968.

- TSP Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā of Kamalaśīla. See TS.
- VS *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*, ed. by Muni Śrī Jambuvijayajī. [*Gaekwad's Oriental Series* 136]. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1961.
- YRZLS Yinming ru zhengli lun shu (因明入正理論疏) of Kuiji: T 1840.

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