@article{oai:soar-ir.repo.nii.ac.jp:00002627, author = {Shinohara, Ryusuke}, issue = {4}, journal = {International Journal of Game Theory}, month = {Oct}, note = {The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com., We examine the coalition-proof equilibria of a participation game in the provision of a (pure) public good. We study which Nash equilibria are achieved through cooperation, and we investigate coalition-proof equilibria under strict and weak domination. We show that under some incentive condition, (i) a profile of strategies is a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium that is not strictly Pareto-dominated by any other Nash equilibrium and (ii) every strict Nash equilibrium for non-participants is a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination., Article, International Journal of Game Theory. 39(4):603-615 (2010)}, pages = {603--615}, title = {Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game}, volume = {39}, year = {2010} }